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EX-POST CORE, FINE CORE AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS
ANUJ BHOWMIK AND JILING CAO
Abstract. This paper investigates the ex-post core and its relationships to
the fine core and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations in
an oligopolistic economy with asymmetric information, in which the set of
agents consists of some large agents and a continuum of small agents and the
space of states of nature is a general probability space. We show that under
appropriate assumptions, the ex-post core is not empty and contains the set
of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. We provide an example of a
pure exchange continuum economy with asymmetric information and infinitely
many states of nature, in which the ex-post core does not coincide with the
set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. We also show that when
our economic model contains either no large agents or at least two large agents
with the same characteristics, the fine core is contained in the ex-post core.
1. Introduction
In general equilibrium theory, the core and competitive equilibrium are two im-
portant solution concepts. For an exchange economy with complete information,
the core and its relationship to the set of competitive allocations have been stud-
ied intensively in the literature (for a comprehensive survey, refer to [3]). In the
past few decades, several alternative cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium
concepts have been proposed, in the context of asymmetric information economies.
The core of an economy with asymmetric information was first considered by Wil-
son [26], where the concepts of coarse and fine core were proposed. The fine core
presumes that agents can share their information when they form a coalition and
an allocation is not in the fine core, if a coalition has some distribution of the total
endowments of its members which gives to all of its members a better pay-off in
an event which the coalition can jointly discern. In [27], Yannelis introduced the
concept of private core, which is an analogue concept to the core for an economy
with complete (and symmetric) information, and proved that under appropriate
assumptions, the private core is always non-empty. In the definition of the private
core, when a coalition blocks an allocation, each member in the coalition uses only
his own private information. Furthermore, Einy et al. [13, 14] studied the no-
tion of ex-post core, in the sense that an ex-post core allocation cannot be ex-post
blocked by any coalition. On the other hand, Radner [23] introduced the notion of a
(Bayesian) rational expectations equilibrium by imposing the Bayesian (subjective
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expected utility) decision doctrine, in order to capture the information revealed
by the market clearing price. The fact that a Bayesian rational expectations equi-
librium does not exist universally motivates de Castro et al. [12] to introduce the
concept of a maxinmin rational expectations equilibrium, by replacing the Bayesian
decision-making approach of Radner with the maximin expected utility. A good
survey article for the equilibrium concepts in asymmetric (or differential) informa-
tion economies is [17].
For economies with complete information, Aumann [6] proved that competitive
and core allocations coincide, provided that there is a continuum of traders. The
existence of such allocations was studied by Aumann [7] and Hildenbrand [19]. Ex-
tensions of these results to economies with asymmetric information were made by
Einy et al. [13, 15]. In [13], Einy et al. first established some representation re-
sults on the ex-post core and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations.
Then, these representations results together with Aumann’s Core Equivalence The-
orem enabled them to show that if the economy is atomless and the utility function
of each agent is measurable with respect to his information, then the set of rational
expectations equilibrium allocations coincides with the ex-post core. In [15], Einy
et al. showed that, if an economy is irreducible, then a competitive (or Walrasian
expectations) equilibrium exists and, moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium
allocations coincides with the private core. However, to obtain these results, they
allow for free disposal on the feasibility (market clearing) constraints. This was
motivated by an example [15] of an economy with asymmetric information which
has a competitive equilibrium with free disposal, but if the feasibility constraints
are imposed with an equality, then the economy does not have a competitive equi-
librium where prices of all contingent contracts for future delivery are non-negative.
In a few years later, Angeloni and Martins-da-Rocha [4] proved that the results in
[15] are still valid without free-disposal.
In the past few years, techniques have been developed by Bhowmik et al. in [10]
to investigate the existence of rational expectations equilibrium in a general model
of pure exchange economies. Moreover, Bhowmik and Cao [11] established a rep-
resentation result for rational expectations equilibrium allocations in terms of the
state-wise Walrasian allocations. As a rational expectation equilibrium allocation
is an interim solution concept and it takes into account the information of all other
agents through market price, Bhowmik and Cao [11] showed their result by assum-
ing that each agent knows his initial endowment and utility. Such assumptions lead
to a fact that the information revealed by prices play no role and thus, the Bayesian
(maximin) rational expectation equilibrium allocations becomes almost the same
as the state-wise Walrasian allocations1.
Our aim of this paper is to apply the results and techniques developed in [10, 11]
to the study of the ex-post core and its relationships to the fine core and the set of
rational expectations equilibrium allocations. We consider an oligopolistic economy
with asymmetric information in which the set of agents consists of some large agents
and a continuum of small agents. The uncertainty is model by a general probability
space of states of nature in which each agent is characterized by a state-dependent
utility function, a random initial endowment, an information partition and a prior
1But they are not the same as both T and Ω are infinite, see Example 3.9 in this paper.
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belief. Firstly, we establish a result on the existence and characterization of the ex-
post core, which can be regarded as an extension of the corresponding result in [13]
to a framework with infinitely many states of the nature. The proof of this result
relies on the measurability of Walrasian equilibrium correspondence with respect
to the information structure in the economy (see Theorem 3.2). In the presence
of the result in [11] and Aumann’s Core Equivalence Theorem, we conclude that
Bayesian (maximin) rational expectation equilibrium allocations are contained the
ex post core. This is a version of the first fundamental theorem of social welfare
for large economies with asymmetric information. However, contrary to the equiv-
alence result for finitely many states of nature in [13], we provide an example of a
continuum economy with asymmetric information and infinitely many states of na-
ture, in which the ex-post core strictly contains all rational expectations equilibrium
allocations. This means that the core-Walras equivalence can fail in a continuum
economy with asymmetric information when it has infinitely many states of nature.
Secondly, we show that under appropriate assumptions and the assumption that
there are only finitely many different information structures and all information
is the joint information of agents, the fine core is contained in the ex-post core.
This extends the corresponding result in [14]. To obtain this result, following [18],
we first associated an atomless economy with our oligopolistic economy so that all
large agents are broken into a continuum of small agents with similar characteris-
tics. The idea of the proof is as follows: if an allocation is not in the ex-post core
of our original economy, it must not be a core allocation in some complete informa-
tion economy and so in the corresponding complete information atomless economy.
Vind’s theorem (see [25]) implies that an arbitrary large coalition can be chosen so
that it discerns any state of nature. With the help of some other techniques, we
are able to show that the allocation is blocked by a coalition that jointly has full
information in our original economy and thus, it is not in the fine core.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework and outlines the basic model. We also study several correspondences
associated with our basic model. These correspondences form the major part of
our tool kits. Section 3 investigates a representation of the ex-post core and its
relationship with the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. Section
4 studies the relationship between the ex-post core and the fine core. Finally, we
provide some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. The Model and Associated Correspondences
In this section, we describe a basic model of a pure exchange mixed economy
with asymmetric information.
2.1. The model. We consider a pure exchange economy E with asymmetric infor-
mation. The exogenous uncertainty is described by a probability space (Ω,F ,P),
where Ω is a set denoting all possible states of nature, the σ-algebra F denotes
possible events, and P is a complete probability measure. The space of agents is
a measure space (T,Σ, µ) with a complete, finite and positive measure µ, where
T is the set of agents, Σ is the σ-algebra of measurable subsets of T whose eco-
nomic weights on the market are given by µ. Since µ(T ) < ∞, a classical result
in measure theory claims that T can be decomposed into the union of two parts:
one is atomelss and the other contains at most countably many atoms, that is,
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T = T0∪T1, where T0 is the atomless part and T1 is the union of at most countably
many µ-atoms, refer to [21, p.155]. Let A = {An : n ≥ 1} be the family of all
atoms in T1, i.e., T1 =
⋃
n≥1An. Agents in T0 are called “small agents”, who are
un-influential agents (the price takers). According to a standard interpretation, we
can think that each An arises from a group of small identical agents that decide to
join and to act on the market only together. As consequence of such agreements, no
proper subcoalitions of the group are possible and then the group is identified with
an atom of µ. Agents in T1 are called “large agents”, who are influential ones (the
oligopolies). With an abuse of notation, we shall identify T1 with A , i.e., T1 = A .
The commodity space is the ℓ-dimensional Euclidean space Rℓ. For λ > 0, B(0, λ)
denotes the ball in Rℓ centred at 0 with radius λ. The partial order on Rℓ is denoted
by ≤. More precisely, for any two vectors x = (x1, ..., xℓ) and y = (y1, ..., yℓ) in Rℓ,
we write x ≤ y (or y ≥ x) if xk ≤ yk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. Furthermore, we write
x < y (or y > x) when x ≤ y and x 6= y, and x ≪ y (or y ≫ x) when xk < yk for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ. Let Rℓ+ = {x ∈ Rℓ : x ≥ 0}, and let Rℓ++ = {x ∈ Rℓ+ : x ≫ 0}. In
each state, the consumption set for every agent t ∈ T is Rℓ+. Each agent t ∈ T is
characterized by a quadruple (Ft, U(t, ·, ·), a(t, ·),Pt), where
(i) Ft is the σ-algebra generated by a measurable partition Πt of Ω represent-
ing the private information of agent t,
(ii) U(t, ·, ·) : Ω× Rℓ+ → R is the state-dependent utility function of agent t,
(iii) a(t, ·) : Ω→ Rℓ+ is the state-dependent initial endowment of agent t, and
(iv) Pt is a probability measure on F , giving the prior belief of agent t.
The quadruple (Ft, U(t, ·, ·), a(t, ·),Pt) is sometimes known as characteristics of
agent t. Two agents are said to be the same type if they have the same character-
istics. Formally, the economy E can be expressed by
E = {(Ω,F ,P); (T,Σ, µ); Rℓ+; (Ft, U(t, ·, ·), a(t, ·),Pt)t∈T }.
In the complete information Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, prices are vectors in
Rℓ+ \ {0}. Following the standard treatment in the literature (e.g., see [7]), price
vectors are normalized so that their sum is 1.
In this paper, we use the symbol ∆ to denote the simplex of normalized price
vectors, i.e.,
∆ =
{
p ∈ Rℓ+ :
ℓ∑
h=1
ph = 1
}
.
Put ∆+ = ∆ ∩ Rℓ++. Throughout the paper, ∆ and ∆+ are equipped with the
relative Euclidean topology. A price system of E is an F -measurable function
π : Ω → ∆, where ∆ is equipped with the Borel structure B(∆) generated by the
relative Euclidean topology.
Let σ(π) be the smallest σ-algebra contained in F and generated by a price
system π. Intuitively, σ(π) represents the information revealed by π. The combina-
tion of agent t’s private information Ft and the information revealed by the price
system π is given by the smallest σ-algebra Gt that contains both Ft and σ(π).
Formally, Gt = Ft ∨ σ(π). For any ω ∈ Ω, let Gt(ω) denote the smallest element of
Gt that contains ω.
As interpreted in [12], the economy E extends over three time periods: ex ante
(τ = 0), interim (τ = 1) and ex post (τ = 2). At τ = 0, the state space, the
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partitions, the structure of the economy and the price functional π : Ω → ∆ are
common knowledge. This stage does not play any role in our analysis and it is
assumed just for a matter of clarity. At τ = 1, each individual learns his private
information and the prevailing prices π(ω), and thus learns Gt. With these in
his mind, the agent plans how much he will consume x(ω). However, his actual
consumption may be contingent to the final state of the nature, which is not yet
known by him. The individual agent only knows that one of the states ω′ ∈ Gt(ω)
will be realized. Therefore, he needs to make sure that he will be able to pay his
consumption plan x(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Gt(ω). At τ = 2, each individual agent t ∈ T
receives and consumes his entitlement ft(ω).
Recall that a function u : Rℓ+ → R is strictly increasing if u(x) < u(y) for any
x, y ∈ Rℓ+ with x < y, and it is quasi concave if
u(αx+ (1− α)y) ≥ min{u(x), u(y)}
for any x, y ∈ Rℓ+ with x 6= y and any 0 < α < 1. In “≥” in the above inequality is
replaced with “>”, then u is called strictly quasi concave.
Throughout the paper, the following standard assumptions will be used. These
assumptions are similar to those in [10, 11].
(A1) The initial endowment function a : (T,Σ, µ) × (Ω,F ,P) → Rℓ+ is Σ ⊗ F -
measurable such that a(·, ω) is Bochner integrable and
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ ≫ 0 for each
ω ∈ Ω.
(A′1) The initial endowment function a : (T,Σ, µ) × (Ω,F ,P) → Rℓ+ is Σ ⊗ F -
measurable such that a(·, ω) is Bochner integrable and a(·, ω)≫ 0 µ-a.e. on T for
each ω ∈ Ω.
(A2) U(·, ·, x) : (T,Σ, µ)× (Ω,F ,P)→ R is Σ⊗F -measurable for all x ∈ Rℓ+.
(A3) For each (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω, U(t, ω, ·) : Rℓ+ → R is continuous and strictly
increasing.
(A4) For each (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω, U(t, ω, ·) is strictly quasi-concave.
(A′4) For each (t, ω) ∈ T1 × Ω, U(t, ω, ·) is quasi-concave.
Here, we would like to add some comments on these assumptions. Note that the
condition “
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ≫ 0 for each ω ∈ Ω” in (A1) or “a(·, ω)≫ 0 µ-a.e. on T for
each ω ∈ Ω” in (A′1), which implies that no commodity is totally absent from the
market, has been commonly used for results on the existence of an equilibrium, for
instance, see [7, 10, 11, 13, 14]. The joint measurability of the initial endowment
a in (A1) and (A
′
1) has been used in [10, 11] for general models of asymmetric
information economies with infinitely many states of nature. The assumption (A′1)
is stronger than (A1) and is used in [8, 9]. Assumption (A2) is equivalent to the
measurability condition used in [6, 7]. Since then, it has been widely used in the
literature, see [10, 11, 14, 13, 15]. Although (A1) and (A2) are not used in Einy et al.
[14], U(t, ·, x) and a(t, ·) are required to be F -measurable for all (t, x) ∈ T × Rℓ+.
Finally, (A3), (A4) and (A
′
4) impose properties on the agents’ utility functions.
These assumptions have been quite commonly used in the literature.
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A member S of Σ with µ(S) > 0 is called a coalition of E . Let L1(µ,R
ℓ) denote
the set of all equivalent classes of Bochner integrable functions from T into Rℓ.
An assignment in E is a function f : T × Ω → Rℓ+ such that for every ω ∈ Ω,
f(·, ω) ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ), and for every t ∈ T , f(t, ·) is F -measurable. If an assignment
f is also feasible, i.e., for every ω ∈ Ω,∫
T
f(·, ω)dµ =
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ,
then it is called an allocation. Note that under (A1), the initial endowment a is an
allocation in E .
2.2. Correspondences Associated with E . Following [10, 11], we define a func-
tion δ : ∆+ → R++ such that for each p = (p1, · · · , pℓ) ∈ ∆+,
δ(p) = min
{
ph : 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ} .
For any (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+, let
γ(t, ω, p) =
1
δ(p)
ℓ∑
h=1
ah(t, ω), and b(t, ω, p) = γ(t, ω, p)1,
where 1 = (1, · · · , 1) ∈ Rℓ. Define the correspondence X : T × Ω×∆+ ⇒ Rℓ+ by
X(t, ω, p) = {x ∈ Rℓ+ : x ≤ b(t, ω, p)}
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+. The budget correspondence B : T × Ω×∆⇒ Rℓ+ is
defined by
B(t, ω, p) =
{
x ∈ Rℓ+ : 〈p, x〉 ≤ 〈p, a(t, ω)〉
}
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω × ∆. Note that X and B are non-empty, closed- and
convex-valued such that B(t, ω, p) ⊆ X(t, ω, p) for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω × ∆+.
Furthermore, the compactness of X(t, ω, p) implies that B(t, ω, p) is compact for
every (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+.
Following [1], we say that a correspondence F : (T,Σ, µ) ⇒ Rℓ is weakly Σ-
measurable if
F−1(V ) = {t ∈ T : F (t) ∩ V 6= ∅} ∈ Σ
for all open subset V of Rℓ. Wherever no confusion arises in the sequel, we shall
omit Σ in the definition of a weakly Σ-measurable correspondence. A function
f : (T,Σ, µ) → Rℓ is called a measurable selection of F if f is Σ-measurable and
f(t) ∈ F (t) µ-a.e..
Lemma 2.1 ([5]). Let F : (T,Σ, µ)⇒ Rℓ be a correspondence. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) F is weakly Σ-measurable.
(ii) F has a measurable graph, that is, GrF ∈ Σ⊗B(Rℓ).
(iii) For every x ∈ Rℓ, dist(x, F (·)) : T → R+ is Σ-measurable.
The following proposition is similar to [10, Proposition 4.1] and is a special case
of [11, Lemma 2].
Proposition 2.2. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A1). Then B is weakly
Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆)-measurable and X is weakly Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆+)-measurable.
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Define the correspondences C : T ×Ω×∆⇒ Rℓ+ and CX : T ×Ω×∆+ ⇒ Rℓ+by
C(t, ω, p) =
{
x ∈ Rℓ+ : U(t, ω, x) ≥ U(t, ω, y) for all y ∈ B(t, ω, p)
}
and
CX(t, ω, p) = C(t, ω, p) ∩X(t, ω, p).
By (A3), for every x ∈ C(t, ω, p) and (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω × ∆, 〈p, x〉 ≥ 〈p, a(t, ω)〉.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that
B(t, ω, p) ∩ C(t, ω, p) = B(t, ω, p) ∩ CX(t, ω, p)
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T ×Ω×∆+. Note that under (A3), U(t, ω, ·) is continuous on the
non-empty compact set B(t, ω, p) for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+. Thus, one has
B(t, ω, p) ∩ C(t, ω, p) 6= ∅
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+.
The following proposition is similar to [10, Proposition 4.2].
Proposition 2.3. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A1)-(A3). Then C
X is
weakly Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆+)-measurable.
Proof. By Proposition 2.2, B is weakly Σ ⊗ F ⊗B(∆)-measurable. Thus, by [1,
Corollary 18.14], there exists a sequence {fn : n ≥ 1} of Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆)-measurable
functions from T × Ω×∆ to Rℓ+ such that
B(t, ω, p) = {fn(t, ω, p) : n ≥ 1}
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆.
For each n ≥ 1, define Cn : T × Ω×∆⇒ Rℓ+ by letting
Cn(t, ω, p) =
{
x ∈ Rℓ+ : U(t, ω, x) ≥ U(t, ω, fn(t, ω, p))
}
,
and ξn : T × Ω×∆× Rℓ+ → R by letting
ξn(t, ω, p, x) = U(t, ω, x)− U(t, ω, fn(t, ω, p)).
Note that ξn(·, ·, ·, x) is Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆)-measurable for all x ∈ Rℓ+, and
C(t, ω, p) =
⋂
{Cn(t, ω, p) : n ≥ 1}
for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆. It follows that for all (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+,
CX(t, ω, p) =
⋂
{Cn(t, ω, p) : n ≥ 1} ∩X(t, ω, p).
Applying an argument similar to that in Proposition 2.2, it can be shown that
each Cn is Σ ⊗ F ⊗ B(∆)-measurable. Since X is compact-valued, then CX is
Σ⊗F ⊗B(∆+)-measurable. 
The idea of the next lemma is included in the proof of [10, Theorem 4.3]. For the
sake of self-completeness of this paper, we extracted it here as a separate lemma
with a complete proof.
Lemma 2.4. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A1)-(A3). Let {pn : n ≥ 1} ⊆
∆+ converge to some p ∈ ∆+. For each (t, ω, p) ∈ T × Ω×∆+,
CX(t, ω, p) ⊆ Li CX(t, ω, pn).
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Proof. Let d ∈ CX(t, ω, p) be an arbitrarily selected vector. If d = b(t, ω, p), then
b(t, ω, pn) ∈ CX(t, ω, pn) and {b(t, ω, pn) : n ≥ 1} converges to d. Now, assume
d < b(t, ω, p). Select some δ > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ such that
d+ (0, · · · , δ
jth
, · · · , 0) ≤ b(t, ω, p),
and a sequence {δi : i ≥ 1} in (0, δ] converging to 0. For each i ≥ 1, let
di = d+ (0, · · · , δi
jth
, · · · , 0),
and choose a sequence {din : n ≥ 1} such that for each n, din ∈ X(t, ω, pn) and
{din : n ≥ 1} converges to di. It is claimed that for each i ≥ 1, din ∈ CX(t, ω, pn)
for sufficiently large n. Otherwise, there must exist an i0 and a subsequence {di0nk :
k ≥ 1} of {di0n : n ≥ 1} such that di0nk /∈ CX(t, ω, pnk). Let bk ∈ B(t, ω, pnk) and
U(t, ω, bk) > U(t, ω, d
i0
nk
)
for all k ≥ 1. Then {bk : k ≥ 1} has a subsequence converging to some b ∈ B(t, ω, p).
By (A3), we have
U(t, ω, b) ≥ U(t, ω, di0) > U(t, ω, d),
which contradicts with d ∈ CX(t, ω, p). It follows from the previous claim that for
each i, {dist(di, CX(t, ω, pn)) : n ≥ 1} converges to 0. Since {di : i ≥ 1} converges
to d, one concludes that {dist(d, CX(t, ω, pn)) : n ≥ 1} converges to 0. This means
that d ∈ Li CX(t, ω, pn). 
To conclude this section, we introduce two more correspondences associated with
an economy E with asymmetric information. For each ω ∈ Ω, let E (ω) denote the
complete information economy, given by
E (ω) =
{
(T,Σ, µ);Rℓ+; (U(t, ω, ·), a(t, ω))t∈T
}
.
The core of E (ω) is denoted by C(E (ω)). The set of all Walrasian equilibria
and all Walrasian equilibrium allocations of E (ω) are denoted by WE(E (ω)) and
WA(E (ω)), respectively. Then, C : ω 7→ C(E (ω)) andWE : ω 7→WE(E (ω)) define
two correspondences.
3. The Ex-post Core and Rational Expectations
Equilibrium Allocations
In this section, we discuss the existence of an ex-post core allocation in our
model and also the relationship between the ex-post core and the set of (Bayesian
or maximin) rational expectations equilibrium allocations.
Definition 3.1. ([13]) Let f be an allocation in an economy E , let S ∈ Σ be a
coalition. We say that f is ex-post blocked by S if there exist a state of nature
ω0 ∈ Ω and an assignment g such that
(i)
∫
S
g(·, ω0)dµ =
∫
S
a(·, ω0)dµ, and
(ii) U(t, ω0, g(t, ω0)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)) µ-a.e. on S.
In addition, an allocation f is called an ex-post core allocation if it cannot be ex-
post blocked by any coalition. The ex-post core of E , denoted by C(E ), is the set
of all the ex-post core allocations of E .
The main result of this section is the following theorem on the ex-post core.
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Theorem 3.2. Suppose that an economy E satisfies (A1)-(A4). Then the ex-post
core of E is not empty. Moreover,
C(E ) = {f : f is an allocation and f(ω, ·) ∈ C(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω} .
To provide a proof of Theorem 3.2, we need some preparation. First of all,
the following result, which is a special case of the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski
measurable selection theorem (refer to [1, 18.13]), will be needed.
Lemma 3.3. Let F : T ⇒ Rℓ be a weakly Σ-measurable correspondence such
that F (t) is non-empty and closed for all t ∈ T . Then F admits a Σ-measurable
selection.
Secondly, the following result on the weak measurability of WE is also needed
for the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.4. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A1)-(A3) and (A
′
4). Then
WE is weakly F -measurable.
Proof. Note that under the given assumptions,WE(ω) 6= ∅ for all ω ∈ Ω. Consider
the correspondences F : (Ω,F ,P)⇒ L1(µ,R
ℓ), defined by
F (ω) =
{
f ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ) :
∫
T
fdµ−
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ = 0
}
and G : (Ω,F ,P) ⇒ L1(µ,R
ℓ)×∆, defined by G(ω) = F (ω)×∆. First of all, we
claim that F has a measurable graph, and thus G also has a measurable graph. To
see this, define a function ϕ : (Ω,F ,P)× L1(µ,Rℓ)→ Rℓ by
ϕ(ω, f) =
∫
T
fdµ−
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ.
Note that for every f ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ), ϕ(·, f) is F -measurable and for every ω ∈
Ω, ϕ(ω, ·) is norm-continuous. Thus, ϕ is F ⊗ B(L1(µ,Rℓ))-measurable. The
conclusion follows from the fact GrF = ϕ
−1(0).
Let Qn∩∆+ = R, where Qn is the set of vectors in Rℓ with rational components.
Note that R is countable and dense in ∆. For each p ∈ R, define a correspondence
Hp : (Ω,F ,P) ⇒ L1(µ,R
ℓ) by Hp(ω) = SCX(·,ω,p), where SCX(·,ω,p) is the set
of integrable selections of CX(·, ω, p). Fix a p ∈ R and define a function ζ :
L1(µ,R
ℓ) × (Ω,F ,P) → R+ by ζ(g, ω) = dist(g,Hp(ω)). Furthermore, for each
g ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ), let the function ξg : (T,Σ, µ)× (Ω,F ,P)→ R+ be defined by
ξg(t, ω) = dist
(
g(t), CX(t, ω, p)
)
.
Claim 1. For each simple function g ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ), ζ(g, ω) =
∫
T
ξg(·, ω)dµ holds for
all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Claim 1. Let g ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ) be a given simple measurable function. As g is
a step-function with finitely many values, it follows from Lemma 2.1 and Proposition
2.3 that ξg is Σ⊗F -measurable. In addition, since
ξg(t, ω) ≤ ‖g(t)− b(t, ω, p)‖
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for all (t, ω) ∈ T×Ω, ξg(·, ω) is also integrably bounded and thus ξg(·, ω) ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ)
for all ω ∈ Ω. It is easy to check that ∫
T
ξg(·, ω)dµ ≤ ζ(g, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Suppose∫
T
ξg(·, ω0)dµ < ζ(g, ω0) holds for some ω0 ∈ Ω. Then, there is an ε > 0 such that∫
T
ξg(·, ω0)dµ+ εµ(T ) < ζ(g, ω0).
Next, we define A : T ⇒ Rℓ and α : T × Rℓ → R by
A(t) =
{
y ∈ CX(t, ω0, p) : ‖g(t)− y‖ ≤ ξg(t, ω0) + ε
}
and
α(t, y) = ‖g(t)− y‖ − ξg(t, ω0).
As done in the above, it can be shown that α is Σ⊗F -measurable and thus
GrA =
{
(t, y) ∈ T × Rℓ : α(t, y) ≤ ε} ∩GrCX(·,ω0,p)
is measurable. By Lemma 3.3, A has a measurable selection h : T → Rℓ satisfying
‖g − h‖L1 ≤
∫
T
ξg(·, ω0)dµ+ εµ(T ).
As h ∈ Hp(ω0), we have
ζ(g, ω0) ≤
∫
T
ξg(·, ω0)dµ+ εµ(T ),
which is a contradiction. 
Claim 2. For each function g ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ), ζ(g, ω) =
∫
T
ξg(·, ω)dµ holds for all
ω ∈ Ω, and thus Hp is weakly F -measurable.
Proof of Claim 2. Let {gn : n ≥ 1} be a sequence of simple measurable functions
converging to g in L1(µ,R
ℓ). By [1, Theorem 13.6], there is a subsequence {gnk :
k ≥ 1} of {gn : n ≥ 1} and a function h ∈ L1(µ,Rℓ) such that |gnk | ≤ h for all k ≥ 1
and {gnk : k ≥ 1} converges pointwise to g. Thus, {ξgnk (t, ω) : k ≥ 1} converges to
ξg(t, ω) for all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω. As
ξgnk (t, ω) ≤ ‖h(t) + b(t, ω, p)‖,
we have {ξgnk (·, ω) : k ≥ 1} is dominated by the integrable function h + b(·, ω, p).
Hence, by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, we have
lim
k→∞
∫
T
ξgnk (·, ω)dµ =
∫
T
ξg(·, ω)dµ
for all ω ∈ Ω. On the other hand, {ζ(gnk , ω) : k ≥ 1} converges to ζ(g, ω) for every
ω ∈ Ω. Thus, we have
ζ(g, ω) =
∫
T
ξg(·, ω)dµ
for all ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, since each ζ(gnk , ·) is F -measurable, we have ζ(g, ·) is
F -measurable. Thus, Hp is weakly F -measurable. 
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Define a correspondence H : (Ω,F ,P)⇒ L1(µ,R
ℓ)×∆ by letting
H(ω) =
⋃
{Hp(ω)× {p} : p ∈ R}
for all ω ∈ Ω, where the closure operation is taken in the product topology on
L1(µ,R
ℓ)×∆ induced by the norm of L1(µ,Rℓ) and the norm of Rℓ.
Claim 3. WE(ω) = H(ω) ∩G(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof of Claim 3. Fix some ω ∈ Ω. Let (f, p) ∈ WE(ω). Clearly, (f, p) ∈ G(ω).
By (A3), we have p ∈ ∆+. It follows that f(t) ∈ CX(t, ω, p) µ-a.e. on T . Now,
suppose that {pn : n ≥ 1} ⊆ R is a sequence converging to p. By Claim 2,
dist(f,Hpn(ω)) =
∫
T
ηndµ,
where ηn : T → R+ is defined by ηn(t) = dist(f(t), CX(t, ω, pn)). By Lemma 2.4,
CX(t, ω, p) ⊆ Li CX(t, ω, pn)
for all t ∈ T . Hence, for each t ∈ T and each n ≥ 1, we can choose some fn(t) ∈
CX(t, ω, pn) such that fn(t)→ f(t), µ-a.e on T . It follows that ηn(t)→ 0, µ-a.e on
T . Define
β = inf ({δ(pn) : n ≥ 1} ∪ {δ(p)}) .
Then β > 0 and for each t ∈ T , let
d(t) =
1
β
ℓ∑
h=1
ah(t, ω).
Note that
ηn(t) ≤ ‖fn(t)− f(t)‖ ≤ 2‖d(t)1‖,
µ-a.e on T for all n ≥ 1. By the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem again,
we have
dist(f,Hpn(ω)) =
∫
T
ηndµ→ 0.
It follows that (f, p) ∈ H(ω).
Let (f, p) ∈ H(ω) ∩G(ω) for an arbitrarily fixed ω ∈ Ω. Analogous to the proof
of Claim 2, we can find a sequence {rn : n ≥ 1} ⊆ R and fn ∈ Hrn(ω) such that
(fn, rn)→ (f, p) in L1(µ,Rℓ)×∆, as n→∞ and {fn : n ≥ 1} pointwise converges
to f . Since p ∈ ∆, by (A1), we must have 〈p,
∫
T
a(·, ω)dµ〉 > 0. Put,
S = {t ∈ T : 〈p, a(t, ω)〉 > 0} .
Definitely, S ∈ Σ and µ(S) > 0. Define
An = {t ∈ S : fn(t) /∈ CX(t, ω, rn)} and A =
⋃
{An : n ≥ 1}.
Since µ(An) = 0 for all n ≥ 1, one must have µ(A) = 0. Choose a t ∈ S \ A.
If f(t) /∈ C(t, ω, p) for some t ∈ S \ A, by (A3), there must exist an element
y ∈ Rℓ+ such that 〈p, y〉 < 〈p, a(t, ω)〉 and U(t, ω, y) > U(t, ω, f(t)). As a result,
〈rn, y〉 < 〈rn, a(t, ω)〉 and U(t, ω, y) > U(t, ω, fn(t)) for sufficiently large n, which is
a contradiction. Thus, f(t) ∈ C(t, ω, p) for all t ∈ S \A. Since U(t, ω, ·) is strictly
increasing, 〈p, f(t)〉 ≥ 〈p, a(t, ω)〉 µ-a.e. on S. Moreover, 〈p, f(t)〉 ≥ 0 = 〈p, a(t, ω)〉
for all t ∈ T \ S. Hence, 〈p, f(t)〉 ≥ 〈p, a(t, ω)〉 µ-a.e. on T , which together with
the feasibility of f implies that f(t) ∈ B(t, ω, p) µ-a.e. on T . If µ(T \ S) = 0, then
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(f, p) ∈WE(ω). Otherwise, we first claim that p ∈ ∆+. If not, there is some z > 0
such that 〈p, z〉 = 0. Consequently, f(t) + z ∈ B(t, ω, p) and
U(t, ω, f(t) + z) > U(t, ω, f(t))
for all t ∈ S \ A, which is a contradiction. So, B(t, ω, p) = {0} and f(t) = 0 for
µ-a.e. on T \ S. Thus, (f, p) ∈WE(ω). 
By Claim 2, GrWE = GrH ∩ GrG. Since both GrH and GrG are measurable,
GrWE is measurable. Hence, WE is weakly F -measurable. 
Now, we are ready to provide a proof of Theorem 3.2, as promised previously.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First of all, for the sake of convenience, we put
X = {f : f is an allocation and f(·, ω) ∈ C(E (ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω} .
It is easy to see that WE is non-empty closed-valued. Then, following Theorem
3.4, WE is weakly Σ-measurable. By Lemma 3.3, WE has a measurable selection
ω 7→ (f(·, ω), π(ω)). Note that π(ω) ∈ ∆+ for all ω ∈ Ω. Under assumption (A4),
B(t, ω, π(ω))∩CX (t, ω, π(ω)) is singleton for all (t, ω) ∈ T ×Ω. Let g : T ×Ω→ Rℓ+
be the function defined by
g(t, ω) = B(t, ω, π(ω)) ∩ CX(t, ω, π(ω))
for all (t, ω) ∈ T×Ω. By Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.3, g is Σ⊗F -measurable.
Hence, g(t, ·) is F -measurable for all t ∈ T . For all ω ∈ Ω, g(·, ω) = f(·, ω) µ-
a.e., which implies that (g(·, ω), π(ω)) ∈ WE(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. It follows that
g(·, ω) ∈ C(E (ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω. Hence, X 6= ∅. Then, it is straightforward to see
that X ⊆ C(E ).
To show that C(E ) ⊆ X , we suppose that there exists an f ∈ C(E ) \X . Then
there exists a state ω0 ∈ Ω such that f(·, ω0) 6∈ C(E (ω0)). This means that f
is blocked in E (ω0) by some coalition S. Therefore, there exists an assignment
g : T → Rℓ+ in E (ω0) such that
(i)
∫
S
gdµ =
∫
S
a(·, ω0)dµ, and
(ii) U(t, ω0, g(t)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)) µ-a.e. on S.
Define
Ω0 =
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
S
gdµ =
∫
S
a(·, ω)dµ
}
.
Obviously, ω0 ∈ Ω0 and Ω0 ∈ F . Define a function h : T × Ω→ Rℓ+ by
h(t, ω) =
{
g(t), if (t, ω) ∈ S × Ω0;
a(t, ω), otherwise.
Then, it can be readily checked that h is an assignment in E such that
(iii)
∫
S
h(·, ω0)dµ =
∫
S
a(·, ω0)dµ, and
(iv) U(t, ω0, h(t, ω0)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)) µ-a.e. on S.
This means that f is ex-post blocked by S (via an assignment h at the state ω0),
which contradicts with the fact of f ∈ C(E ). 
EX-POST CORE, FINE CORE AND REE ALLOCATIONS 13
Next, we discuss the consequences of Theorems 3.2 and 3.4. We need to intro-
duce two competitive equilibrium concepts in the economy model E discussed in
Subsection 2.1: maximin rational expectations equilibrium and Bayesian rational
expectations equilibrium. Given an agent t ∈ T , a state of nature ω ∈ Ω and a
price system π : Ω→ ∆, let BREE(t, ω, π) be defined by
BREE(t, ω, π) =
{
x ∈ (Rℓ+)Ω : x(ω′) ∈ B(t, ω′, π(ω′)) for all ω′ ∈ Gt(ω)
}
.
The maximin utility of each agent t ∈ T with respect to Gt at x : Ω→ Rℓ+ in state
ω ∈ Ω, denoted by U
¯
REE(t, ω, x), is defined by
U
¯
REE(t, ω, x) = inf {U(t, ω′, x(ω′)) : ω′ ∈ Gt(ω)} .
Definition 3.5 ([12]). Given an allocation f and a price system π in an economy
E , the pair (f, π) is called a maximin rational expectations equilibrium (abbreviated
as maximin REE) of E if f(t, ω) ∈ B(t, ω, π(ω)) and f(t, ·) maximizes U
¯
REE(t, ω, ·)
on BREE(t, ω, π) for all (t, ω) ∈ T ×Ω. In this case, f is called a maximin rational
expectations allocation, and the set of such allocations is denoted by MREE(E ).
Define LREEt by
LREEt = {x ∈ (Rℓ+)Ω : x is Gt-measurable}.
For a given x ∈ LREEt , recall that the Bayesian expected utility of agent t with
respect to Gt at x is given by Et [U(t, ·, x)|Gt].
Definition 3.6 ([2, 23]). Given an allocation f and a price system π in an economy
E , the pair (f, π) is called a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium (abbreviated
as Bayesian REE) of E if
(i) for each t ∈ T , f(t, ·) is Gt-measurable;
(ii) for all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω, f(t, ω) ∈ B(t, ω, π(ω));
(iii) for all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω,
Et [U(t, ·, f(t, ·))|Gt] (ω) = max
x∈BREE(t,ω,π)∩LREE
t
Et [U(t, ·, x)|Gt] (ω),
In this case, f is called a rational expectations allocation, and the set of such allo-
cations is denoted by REE(E ).
As a corollary of Theorem 3.4, we can retrieve the result on the existence of a
maximin REE or Bayesian REE obtained in [11].
Proposition 3.7. If an economy E satisfies assumptions (A1)-(A4), then we have
MREE(E ) = REE(E ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Note that under the assumption WE(ω) 6= ∅ for all ω ∈ Ω. From the proof
of Theorem 3.4, we can see that WE is closed-valued and weakly Σ-measurable,
thus it has a F -measurable selection ω 7→ (f(ω), π(ω)). Then, it is easy to verify
that the pair (g, π) defined in the proof of Theorem 3.2 is a maximin rational
expectations equilibrium of E . 
As a consequence of Theorem 3.2 and [11, Corollary 1], we deduce the following
version of the first fundamental theorem of social welfare for our model.
Corollary 3.8. Suppose that an economy E satisfies (A1)-(A4). Then, we have
MREE(E ) = REE(E ) ⊆ C(E ).
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Next, we provide an example of a continuum economy E with asymmetric in-
formation and infinitely many states of nature in which the ex-post core C(E ) can
strictly contain REE(E ).
Example 3.9. Consider an economy E defined by
E =
{
(Ω,F ,P); (T,Σ, µ);Rℓ+; (Ft, U(t, ·, ·), a(t, ·),Pt)t∈T
}
,
where T = Ω = [0, 1], Σ and F are the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1], µ and P are
the Lebesgue probability measure. The commodity space is R2. Let Ft and Pt be
arbitrary information partition and the prior belief of agent t ∈ T . The utility and
the initial endowment of each agent are given by U(t, ω, x) =
√
x1 +
√
x2 and
a(t, ω) =
{
(1, 2), if (t, ω) ∈ [0, 12]× Ω;
(3, 2), if (t, ω) ∈ ( 12 , 1]× Ω,
respectively. Then E (ω) = E (ω′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. Furthermore, it can be easily
checked that (A1)-(A4) are satisfied.
For every p = (p1, p2) ∈ ∆+, the demand of agent t in each state is given by
D(t, ω, p) =


(
p2(1+p2)
p1
, p1(1+p2)
p2
)
, if (t, ω) ∈ [0, 12]× Ω;(
p2(2+p1)
p1
, p1(2+p1)
p2
)
, if (t, ω) ∈ ( 12 , 1]× Ω.
By the market-clearing condition, we can show that the equilibrium price is p0 =
(12 ,
1
2 ). Thus, D(t, ω, p0) =
(
3
2 ,
3
2
)
for all (t, ω) ∈ [0, 12]×Ω and D(t, ω, p0) = ( 52 , 52)
for all (t, ω) ∈ ( 12 , 1]×Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω, let h : T → R2+ be an allocation in E (ω)
defined by
h(t) =
{ (
3
2 ,
3
2
)
, if t ∈ [0, 12];(
5
2 ,
5
2
)
, if t ∈ ( 12 , 1].
Take a subset A of Ω with A /∈ F , and consider f : T × Ω→ R2+, defined by
f(t, ω) =
{
(1, 1), if t ∈ A and t = ω;
h(t), otherwise.
(i) It is clear that f is feasible.
(ii) For each t ∈ T , f(t, ·) is F -measurable. To see this, we first choose t ∈ A. In
this case, f(t, ω) = h(t) for all ω ∈ Ω with ω 6= t; and f(t, ω) = (1, 1) if ω = t.
Now, take t ∈ T \ A, then f(t, ω) = h(t) for all ω ∈ Ω. Thus, in both cases, f(t, ·)
is F -measurable.
(iii) It is clear that for each ω ∈ Ω, f(·, ω) is µ-integrable.
Since (f(·, ω), p0) ∈WE(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω, we conclude that f ∈ C(E (ω)) and
thus f ∈ C(E ). Now, consider two mappings g1 : t 7→ (t, t) and g2 : (t, t) 7→ t
defined by g1(t) = (t, t) and g2(t, t) = t, respectively. It can be readily checked that
(g2 ◦ f ◦ g1)(t) =
{
1, if t ∈ A;
e(t), otherwise,
where e(t) = 32 if t ∈
[
0, 12
]
; and e(t) = 52 if t ∈
(
1
2 , 1
]
. Since A 6∈ F , then g2 ◦ f ◦ g1
is not F -measurable. It follows that f is not Σ ⊗F -measurable. By Corollary 1
in [11], REE(E ) 6= ∅ and f /∈ REE(E ).
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4. The Ex-post Core and the Fine Core
In this section, we study the relationship between the ex-post core and the
fine core in a mixed economy with asymmetric information. We show that under
appropriate assumptions, the fine core is contained in the ex-post core (see Theorem
4.6). This extends a result of Einy et al. in [14]. To achieve this goal, we use a
standard approach, which embeds the original mixed economy E into the auxiliary
atomless economy E ∗ obtained by splitting each large agent into a continuum of
small agents of the same type.
4.1. Interpretation via associated continuum economies. We define an atom-
less economy E ∗ associated with E . Let (T ∗1 ,Σ
∗
T1
, µ∗T1) be an atomless, complete
and positive measure space such that T0 ∩ T ∗1 = ∅, where each agent An one-
to-one corresponds to a measurable subset A∗n of T
∗
1 with µ
∗(A∗n) = µ(An) and
T ∗1 =
⋃{A∗n : n ≥ 1}. One can think that T ∗1 is constructed as follows: Partition
the interval [µ(T0), µ(T )], which is identified with T
∗
1 , as the disjoint union of the
intervals A∗n given by A
∗
1 = [µ(T0), µ(T0) + µ(A1)) , · · · , and
A∗n =
[
µ(T0) + µ
(
n−1⋃
i=1
Ai
)
, µ(T0) + µ
(
n⋃
i=1
Ai
))
, · · · .
Define T ∗ = T0 ∪ T ∗1 with the σ-algebra
Σ∗ = ΣT0 ⊕ Σ∗T1 =
{
A ∪B : A ∩B = ∅, A ∈ ΣT0 , B ∈ Σ∗T1
}
and the measure µ∗ : Σ∗ → R+ such that for each C ∈ Σ∗,
µ∗(C) = µT0(C ∩ T0) + µ∗T1(C ∩ T ∗1 ).
Following [9, 22], the space of agents of E ∗ is (T ∗,Σ∗, µ∗). In addition, in E ∗, the
space of states of nature and the consumption set for each agent t ∈ T ∗ at each
state ω ∈ Ω are still (Ω,F ,P) and Rℓ+, respectively. Finally, the characteristics
(F ∗t , U
∗(t, ·, ·), a∗(t, ·),P∗t ) of each agent t ∈ T ∗ in E ∗ are defined as follows:
F
∗
t =
{
Ft, if t ∈ T0;
FAn , if t ∈ A∗n,
U∗(t, ω, ·) =
{
U(t, ω, ·), if (t, ω) ∈ T0 × Ω;
U(An, ω, ·), if (t, ω) ∈ A∗n × Ω,
a∗(t, ω) =
{
a(t, ω), if (t, ω) ∈ T0 × Ω;
a(An, ω), if (t, ω) ∈ A∗n × Ω,
and
P∗t =
{
Pt, if t ∈ T0;
PAn , if t ∈ A∗n.
For each ω ∈ Ω, we can define an atomless and deterministic economy E ∗(ω)
associated with E (ω) as
E
∗(ω) =
{
(T ∗,Σ∗, µ∗);Rℓ+; (U
∗(t, ω, ·), a∗(t, ω))t∈T∗
}
.
Similar to that of E , we call a member S of Σ∗ with µ∗(S) > 0 a coalition of E ∗.
Given a coalition S ∈ Σ∗ of E ∗, let Σ∗S = {A ∈ Σ∗ : A ⊆ S}.
The following lemma is a particular case of [9, Lemma 3.6].
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Lemma 4.1 ([9]). Given ω ∈ Ω, if f ∈ L1
(
µ∗,Rℓ
)
and S,R are two coalitions of
E ∗(ω) such that µ∗(S ∩R) > 0, then
H = cl
{(
µ∗(B),
∫
B
fdµ∗
)
: B ∈ Σ∗S
}
is a convex subset of R × Rℓ. Moreover, for any 0 < δ < 1, there is a sequence
{Cn : n ≥ 1} ⊆ Σ∗S of coalitions in E ∗ such that µ∗(Cn ∩ R) = δµ∗(S ∩ R) for all
n ≥ 1 and
lim
n→∞
∫
Cn
f(·, ω)dµ∗ = δ
∫
S
f(·, ω)dµ∗.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A′1), (A2) and (A3). Let ω ∈ Ω
be a state of nature. If an allocation f∗ in E ∗(ω) is blocked by a coalition S ⊆ T ∗,
then for any 0 < ε ≤ µ∗(S ∩ T ∗1 ), there exist a coalition R∗ such that
R∗ ⊆
⋃{
Si : i ∈ P(S)} ,
µ∗(R∗∩T ∗1 ) = ε and µ(R∗∩Si) > 0 for all i ∈ P(S), and an allocation g∗ in E ∗(ω)
such that f∗ is blocked by R∗ via g∗ in E ∗(ω).
Proof. If ε = µ∗(S ∩ T ∗1 ), there is nothing to prove. So, let 0 < ε < µ∗(S ∩ T ∗1 ). By
the techniques in [9, Lemma 3.5 ], we can find a function h∗ : T ∗ → Rℓ+ such that
U∗(t, ω, h∗(t)) > U∗(t, ω, f∗(t)), µ-a.e on S
and ∫
S
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗ ≫ 0.
Let δ = ε
µ∗(S∩T∗
1
) . For each i ∈ P(S), by Lemma 4.1, there exists a sequence
{Ein : n ≥ 1} ⊆ Σ∗Si of coalitions in E ∗ such that for all n ≥ 1,
µ∗(Ein ∩ T ∗1 ) = δµ∗(Si ∩ T ∗1 )
and
lim
n→∞
∫
Ei
n
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗ = δ
∫
Si
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗.
Let En =
⋃{Ein : i ∈ P(S)} for all n ≥ 1. Then
lim
n→∞
∫
En
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗ = δ
∫
S
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗.
Pick an n0 ≥ 1 such that
b :=
∫
En0
(a∗(·, ω)− h∗(·))dµ∗ ≫ 0.
Put R∗ = En0 and define an allocation g
∗ in E ∗(ω) such that
g∗(t) = h∗(t) +
b
µ∗(R∗)
.
Thus, f∗ is blocked by R∗ via g∗ in E ∗(ω). 
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4.2. The ex-post core and the the fine core. In this subsection, we will present
and prove our main result of this section. We assume that our economy E only
admits finitely many information structures. More precisely, we assume that each
agent’s information partition is a member of {Q1, · · · ,Qn}. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
any coalition S, let Si = {t ∈ S : Πt = Qi} and
P(S) = {i : µ(Si) > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
The symbol
∨{Qi : i ∈ P(S)} is used to denote the σ-algebra on Ω, which is
generated by the common refinement of members of {Qi : i ∈ P(S)}. We will need
the following two additional assumptions.
(A5) µ(T
i) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, T = ⋃{T i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and ∨ni=1 Qi = F .
(A6) All large agents in E are of the same type, i.e., having the same characteristics.
Following [26], an information structure for a coalition S in an economy E is
a family {Gt : t ∈ S} of σ-algebras on Ω such that Gt ⊆ F for all t ∈ S and
{t ∈ S : Gt = G } ∈ Σ for any σ-algebra G on Ω with G ⊆ F . A communication
system for a coalition S is an information structure {Gt : t ∈ S} for S such that
Ft ⊆ Gt ⊆
∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(S)}, µ-a.e. on S.
A communication system {Gt : t ∈ S} for a coalition S is called a full communication
system if Gt =
∨{Qi : i ∈ P(S)}, µ-a.e. on S.
Definition 4.3 ([26]). An allocation f in E is said to be fine blocked by a coalition
S in an economy E if there are an allocation g in E , a communication system
{Gt : t ∈ S} for S and a nonempty event Ω0 ∈
⋂
t∈S Gt such that for all ω ∈ Ω0,∫
S
g(·, ω)dµ =
∫
S
a(·, ω)dµ
and
Et[U(t, ·, g(t, ·))|Gt](ω) > Et[U(t, ·, f(t, ·))|Gt](ω), µ-a.e. on S.
The fine core of E , denoted by Cfine(E ), is the set of all allocations that cannot
be fine blocked by any coalition in E .
Let A 6= ∅. For any allocation f in E , let f¯ : T × Ω → Rℓ+ be an allocation in
E defined by
f¯(t, ω) =


f(t, ω), if (t, ω) ∈ T0 × Ω;
1
µ(T1)
∫
T1
f(·, ω)dµ, if (t, ω) ∈ T1 × Ω.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A′1), (A2)-(A3), (A
′
4) and
(A5)-(A6). If f ∈ Cfine(E ) and A 6= ∅, then
U(t, ω, f¯(t, ω)) = U(t, ω, f(t, ω)), µ-a.e. on T
and for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Firstly, we show that for all (t, ω) ∈ T1 × Ω,
U(t, ω, f(t, ω)) ≥ U(t, ω, f¯(t, ω)).
Suppose the contrary. There exist a state ω0 ∈ Ω and a coalition S ⊆ T1 such that
U(t, ω0, f¯(t, ω0)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0))
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for all t ∈ S. For a sequence {rm : m ≥ 1} ⊆ (0, 1) converging to 1, the function
ζm : S → Rℓ+, defined by
ζm(t) = U(t, ω0, rmf¯(t, ω0)) − U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)),
is ΣS-measurable. For each m ≥ 1, put
Sm = {t ∈ S : ζm(t) > 0}.
As S =
⋃
m≥1 Sm, then µ(Sm0) > 0 for some m0 ≥ 1. Put
z0 = − (1− rm0)µ(Sm0)
µ(T1)
∫
T1
a(·, ω0)dµ.
Choose an ε > 0 with z0 +B(0, 2ε) ⊆ −Rℓ++. For each i ∈ P(T0) and R ∈ ΣT i
0
, let
bi(R) =
∫
R
(f(·, ω0)− a(·, ω0))dµ− rm0µ(Sm0)
µ(T1)
∫
T i
0
(f(·, ω0)− a(·, ω0))dµ.
Applying Lemma 4.1 with δ =
rm0µ(Sm0 )
µ(T1)
, we can get a coalition Ri in E with
Ri ⊆ T i0 such that bi(Ri) ∈ B
(
0, ε
P(T0)
)
. Put
R0 =
⋃
{Ri : i ∈ P(T0)}.
Let E = R0 ∪ Sm0 . Then, by (A5) and (A6), we have∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(E)} = F .
Pick an x ∈ B(0, ε) ∩Rℓ++ and define g : T → Rℓ+ by
g(t) =


f(t, ω0) +
x
µ(R0)
, if t ∈ R0;
rm0 f¯(t, ω0), if t ∈ Sm0 ;
f(t, ω0), otherwise.
Then,
U(t, ω0, g(t)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)), µ-a.e. on E.
Furthermore,∫
E
gdµ =
∫
R0
f(·, ω0)dµ+ rm0µ(Sm0)
µ(T1)
∫
T1
f(·, ω0)dµ+ x.
Using the fact that∫
T1
(f(·, ω0)− a(·, ω0))dµ = −
∫
T0
(f(·, ω0)− a(·, ω0))dµ,
we can easily verify that for all ω ∈ Ω,
−z0 +
∫
E
(g(·)− a(·, ω0))dµ =
∑
i∈P(T0)
bi(Ri) + x ∈ B(0, 2ε).
It follows that
d =
∫
E
a(·, ω0)−
∫
E
gdµ≫ 0.
Then, the function h : E → Rℓ+ defined by h(t) = g(t) + dµ(E) for all t ∈ T , satisfies
U(t, ω0, h(t)) > U(t, ω0, f(t, ω0)), µ-a.e. on E.
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Define
Ω0 =
⋂
{Qi(ω0) : i ∈ P(E)},
where Qi(ω0) is the atom in Qi containing ω0. Note that the set
At = {ω ∈ Ω : U(t, ω, h(t)) > U(t, ω, f(t, ω))}
is F -measurable and ω0 ∈ At for all t ∈ E. Consequently, by (A5) and (A6),
Ω0 ⊆ At for all t ∈ E. Since the map ω 7→
∫
E
a(·, ω)dµ is F -measurable, we have
Ω0 ⊆
{
ω ∈ Ω :
∫
E
hdµ =
∫
E
a(·, ω)dµ
}
.
Define another function y : T × Ω→ Rℓ+ by
y(t, ω) =
{
h(t), if (t, ω) ∈ E × Ω0;
a(t, ω), otherwise.
Note that y is an allocation. Thus, we has
Et
[
U(t, ·, f(t, ·))|
∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(E)}
]
= U(t, ·, f(t, ·))
and
Et
[
U(t, ·, y(t, ·))|
∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(E)}
]
= U(t, ·, y(t, ·)).
Furthermore, for all ω ∈ Ω0, we have
U(t, ω, y(t, ω)) > U(t, ω, f(t, ω)), µ-a.e. on E,
which implies that f is fine blocked by E via y. This contradicts with the assump-
tion that f ∈ Cfine(E ). Hence,
U(t, ω, f(t, ω)) ≥ U(t, ω, f¯(t, ω))
for all (t, ω) ∈ T1 × Ω.
Suppose that there are a state ω∗ ∈ Ω and a coalition D ⊆ T1 such that
U(t, ω∗, f(t, ω∗)) > U(t, ω∗, f¯(t, ω∗))
for all t ∈ D. By Jensen’s inequality,
U
(
t, ω∗,
∫
D
f(·, ω∗)
µ(D)
dµ
)
> U
(
t, ω∗, f¯(t, ω∗)
)
and
U
(
t, ω∗,
∫
T1\D
f(·, ω∗)
µ(T1 \D) dµ
)
≥ U (t, ω∗, f¯(t, ω∗)) .
Let δ = µ(D)
µ(T1)
. Since
f¯(t, ω∗) = δ
∫
D
f(·, ω∗)
µ(D)
dµ+ (1− δ)
∫
T1\D
f(·, ω∗)
µ(T1 \D) dµ,
then
U(t, ω∗, f¯(t, ω∗)) > U(t, ω∗, f¯(t, ω∗)).
This is a contradiction, which implies that
U(t, ω, f¯(t, ω)) = U(t, ω, f(t, ω))
for all (t, ω) ∈ T × Ω. 
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Corollary 4.5. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A′1), (A2)-(A3), (A
′
4) and
(A5)-(A6). Then f ∈ C(E ) if and only if f¯ ∈ C(E ).
The following theorem is an extension of [14, Theorem 3.1] to a mixed economy.
Theorem 4.6. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A′1), (A2)-(A3), (A
′
4) and
(A5)-(A6). If either |A | ≥ 2 or A = ∅, then Cfine(E ) ⊆ C(E ).
Proof. First, we assume |A | ≥ 2 and f ∈ Cfine(E ). If f 6∈ C(E ), then, by Corollary
4.5, f¯ 6∈ C(E ). By Theorem 3.2, there is an ω0 ∈ Ω such that f¯(·, ω0) 6∈ C (E (ω0)).
Next, we consider an allocation f¯∗ : T ∗ → Rℓ+ in E ∗(ω0) defined by
f¯∗(t) =


f(t, ω0), if t ∈ T0;
1
µ(T1)
∫
T1
f(·, ω)dµ, if t ∈ T ∗1 .
It is clear that f¯∗ 6∈ C (E ∗(ω0)). Choose an arbitrary An0 ∈ A and let µ(An0) =
ε > 0. By Vind’s theorem (see [8, Theorem 3.1] or [25]), f¯∗ is blocked by a coalition
S in E ∗(ω0), which can be chosen such that µ
∗(S) = µ(T0) + ε, if
µ∗(T ∗1 \A∗n0) < min{µ(T i0) : i ∈ P(T0)},
and
µ∗(S) > µ∗(T ∗)−min{µ(T i0) : i ∈ P(T0)},
otherwise. In either case, it can be checked that µ∗(S ∩ T ∗1 ) ≥ ε and P(S) =
{1, 2, · · · , n}. By Lemma 4.2, we can have a coalition E∗ in E ∗(ω0) with
E∗ ⊆
⋃
{S ∩ (T i)∗ : i ∈ P(S)},
P(E∗) = P(S) and µ∗(E∗ ∩ T ∗1 ) = ε, which blocks f¯∗ via h∗ in E ∗(ω0). Consider
a coalition E in E defined by E = (E∗ ∩ T0) ∪ An0 . Then, P(E) = {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Now, we consider a function h : E → Rℓ+ defined by
h(t) =


h∗(t), if t ∈ E∗ ∩ T0;
1
ε
∫
E∗∩T∗
1
h∗dµ∗, otherwise.
Obviously,
U(t, ω0, h(t)) > U(t, ω0, f¯(t, ω0)), µ-a.e. on E
∗ ∩ T0.
By Jensen’s inequality, if t ∈ An0 , we have
U(t, ω0, h(t)) > U(t, ω0, f¯(t, ω0)).
Moreover, ∫
E
hdµ =
∫
E
a(·, ω0)dµ.
Similar to that in Theorem 4.4, we can define Ω0 and an allocation y : T ×Ω→ Rℓ+
in E such that
y(t, ω) =
{
h(t), if (t, ω) ∈ E × Ω0;
a(t, ω), otherwise.
Note that
Et
[
U(t, ·, f(t, ·))|
∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(E)}
]
= U(t, ·, f(t, ·))
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and
Et
[
U(t, ·, y(t, ·))|
∨
{Qi : i ∈ P(E)}
]
= U(t, ·, y(t, ·)).
Thus, f is fine blocked by E via y. This is a contradiction.
In case that A = ∅, f ∈ Cfine(E ) but f 6∈ C(E ), an argument similar to the
previous case can be applied. The major difference is that in this case, the blocking
coalition E can be chosen such that
µ(E) > µ(T0)−min{µ(T i0) : i ∈ P(T0)}.
The rest part of the proof is almost identical with that of the previous case. 
Applying the core-Walras equivalence theorem in [18, 24], we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.7. Assume that an economy E satisfies (A′1), (A2)-(A3), (A
′
4) and
(A5)-(A6). If f ∈ Cfine(E ), then f(ω, ·) ∈WA(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
5. Concluding Remarks
A considerable amount of research work on different types of core and equilibrium
concepts in economies with asymmetric information can be found in the literature.
In particular, attempts in extending the classical equivalence of competitive equilib-
rium allocations and core allocations in a standard complete information economy
have been made. For instance, the reader can refer to [14, 15, 16, 20]. In this paper,
we focus our study on the ex-post core and its relationships to the fine core and
the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations, in two major parts.
The fist part of the paper concerns the relationship between the ex-post core and
the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. For our economic model, we
apply a variety of techniques from Set-Valued Analysis to establish a representation
result on the ex-post core (see Theorem 3.2). In an early paper [11], Bhowmik and
Cao established a similiar representation result for the set of rational expectations
equilibrium allocations. These two representation results imply that for our model
of asymmetric information economies, rational expectations equilibrium allocations
are contained in the ex-post core (see Corollary 3.8).
To our knowledge, the idea of representing the ex-post core (resp. the set of
rational expectations equilibrium allocations) by selections from the core (resp.
competitive equilibrium) correspondence of the associated family of complete infor-
mation economies is from [13]. The fundamental difference between [13] and this
paper is that economies in [13] are assumed to have only finitely many states of
nature, while economies in this paper are allowed to have infinitely many states of
nature. Representation results in [13], together with Aumann’s Core Equivalence
Theorem, imply that if the economy is atomless and the utility function of each
trader is measurable with respect to his information field, then the set of rational
expectations equilibrium allocations coincides with the ex-post core. However, this
generally does not hold, when an atomless asymmetric information economy has
infinitely many states of nature (see Example 3.9).
The second part of this paper emphasizes on the relationship between the fine
core and the ex-post core in oligopolistic economies. We show that under stan-
dard assumptions and the assumption that there are only finitely many different
information structures and all information is the joint information of agents, the
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fine core is contained in the ex-post core, if an economy is either atomless or has
at least two large agents with the same characteristics (see Theorem 4.6). This
result can be regarded as an extension of the corresponding result in [14], where
economies are assumed to be atomless only and have only finitely many states of
nature. It would be interesting to know if the conclusion of Theorem 4.6 still holds
for a mixed economy with only one large agent or with two large agents having
different characteristics.
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